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SALIM AHMED HAMDAN, 
   Petitioner, 
v. 
DONALD H. RUMSFELD, ET AL., 
   Respondents. 
__________ 
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before 
Judgment to the United States Court Of 
Appeals For The District Of Columbia 
Circuit 
__________ 
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER 
__________ 
 
1. The need for certiorari before judgment is even more 
compelling now than when the Petition was filed. 
Although briefing in the Court of Appeals will be 
completed by January 10, 2005, the Court of Appeals has 
announced that it will not hear oral argument until March 8, 
2005, two months from now.  Any opposition to certiorari 
before judgment based on the Court of Appeals’ “expedited” 
treatment of this case must therefore fail.  
Moreover, the two other District Court Judges with 
pending military-commission cases recently stayed them to 
await the outcome of this case.  Reply App. 1-4.  As a result, 
the entire commission process, and all pending challenges to 
it, have ground to a halt.  Every commission defendant now 
sits at Guantanamo awaiting final resolution of the 
exceptionally important questions presented in this case. 
The proper disposition of this Petition boils down to one 
question: Does the benefit of having the views of one Circuit 
Court outweigh the need for prompt, final resolution by this 
Court?  In this unique case, involving pure questions of law, 
the need for prompt and final resolution eclipses the value of 




2. It seems probable that the Court will decide – sooner 
or later – the legality of the military commission process 
challenged in this case.  The process was established without 
Congressional guidance and fails to provide what has long 
been understood to be required by the Constitution, 
international law, military law, and the common law.  The 
issue would appear to be not whether, but when, the Court 
will grant review. Respondents agree that the questions are 
exceptionally important and warrant swift resolution (Pet. 
App. 49-52), as do many amici.1  This case will affect the well-
being of Americans and other individuals from around the 
world who have been or may be captured in armed conflicts.  
The real-world need for this Court’s review regarding 
the Executive’s legal interpretations is manifest.  Compare, 
e.g., Tr. of Oral Argument at 22-23, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, No. 
03-1027 (Question: “Suppose the executive says, `Mild 
torture, we think, will help get this information?’…Some 
systems do that to get information.” Answer “Well, our 
executive doesn't”) with, e.g., Neil Lewis, Fresh Details Emerge 
on Harsh Methods at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at 
A11 (“While all the detainees were threatened with harsh 
tactics if they did not cooperate, about one in six were 
eventually subjected to those procedures, one former 
interrogator estimated. The interrogator said that when new 
interrogators arrived they were told they had great 
flexibility in extracting information from detainees because 
the Geneva Conventions did not apply at the base.”).   
The questions presented here directly follow from, and 
compare in magnitude to, those presented in Ex parte Quirin, 
317 U.S. 1 (1942), Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 937 (1952), Reid v. Covert, 357 U.S. 1 (1957), and Wilson v. 
Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 526 (1957).  In all of these cases, the 
Court granted certiorari before judgment.  It would be hard 
to devise a case that more clearly warrants certiorari before 
judgment under this Court’s traditions and the Expediting 
Act, 28 U.S.C. §1254(1) and §2101(e), than this one.   
                                                
1 In addition to the amici who have filed briefs in this Court, eighteen 
different entities filed amicus briefs in the Court of Appeals in support of 
affirming the decision below.  These briefs are available at 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/nkk/publications.html#h.  
Petitioner has asked the Court of Appeals for hearing en banc if certiorari 




3. Quirin, Respondents’ leading case, confirms that 
certiorari before judgment is appropriate here. Pet. 7-8. In 
Quirin, the Court ordered the case heard at the defendants’ 
request due to the “public importance of the questions raised” 
and “because in our opinion the public interest required that 
we consider and decide those questions without any 
avoidable delay.”  317 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added).  
The Government’s efforts to distinguish Quirin on the 
facts are unavailing.  Contrary to the Government’s 
suggestions (Br. Opp. 13-15), (1) the Court did not grant 
review in Quirin after the District Court “denied” the 
defendants’ Petition, but instead granted review before the 
District Court acted;2 (2) the defendants did not face 
imminent execution when the Court granted review, instead 
they had not even been found guilty by the commission;3 
and (3) the Court did not place any weight on the citizenship 
of the defendants, six of seven of whom were in any event 
German,  317 U.S. at 20, 37-38. 
  Respondents’ efforts to avoid Quirin based on 
subsequent case law are equally unavailing.  Respondents 
argue (at 14) that Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 
(1975) had not been decided.  But Councilman did not 
undercut Quirin’s emphasis on the “public interest” 
warranting immediate review or announce an abstention 
rule different from that in place during Quirin.  See id. at 754-
56; Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1971); In re Grimley, 
107 U.S. 147 (1890); Reaves v. Ainsworth, 28 App. D.C. 157 
(1906). And also contrary to Respondents’ assertion (at 13-
14), Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), did not make 
the legality of the commissions challenged here clearer – and 
therefore less certworthy – than that of those challenged in 
Quirin.  Respondents themselves acknowledge that the 
Geneva Convention and UCMJ issues presented here “are all 
novel.”  Br. Opp. 10.4  In any event, Respondents’ claim 
                                                
2 See Bittker, The World War II German Saboteurs' Case and Writs of 
Certiorari Before Judgment by the Court of Appeals, 14 Const. Comment. 431, 
446-51 (1997); Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J. S. Ct. Hist. 61 (1996). 
3 Id. 
4 The Petition’s first question, which is essentially the same as 
Respondents’ Questions 2-4, asks whether the Geneva Conventions 
provide a judicially enforceable rule of decision. The Government has told 




favors certiorari, for only this Court can determine the 
meaning and reach of Quirin and Hamdi. See Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).     
4. Whatever weight the views of the Solicitor General 
might be accorded in other contexts, here, as Respondent,5 
he has already stated in the strongest terms the importance 
of the questions presented.  As the amicus briefs underscore, 
Petitioner’s contention regarding the need for this Court’s 
immediate resolution is widely shared. 
The Government suggests that appellate review may 
clarify the issues, analogizing this case to the detention cases 
Hamdi and Rasul.  But the questions presented do not 
concern the President’s power to detain enemy combatants.  
In assessing detention, judicial incrementalism and lower-
court percolation are appropriate to prevent shackling the 
Executive.  The test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 
(1976), contemplated in Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648-52 
(plurality), for example, involves mixed questions of fact and 
law that inherently lend themselves to careful evaluation by 
lower courts of the specific circumstances in a given case.  
This case, however, is entirely different.  It presents pure 
questions of law.  The lawfulness of the means by which  the 
President has conjured these new tribunals and of the 
procedures those tribunals employ are questions within the 
particular expertise and ultimate authority of this Court.6  
                                                                                                 
this general issue.  Pet. App. 51. The Petition’s other question concerns the 
interpretation and reach of this Court’s decisions in Quirin, Councilman, 
and Hamdi, as well as Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Duncan 
v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946), 
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952), and Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
5 Cf. U.S. Br. Opp., Rasul v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States, Nos. 
03-334 and 03-343, at 19 (opposing certiorari because “[t]he potential for 
interference with the core power of the President in this litigation is 
therefore even more acute in this case than it was in Eisentrager.”), cert. 
granted 540 U.S. 1003 (2003); U.S. Br. Opp., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-6696, 
at 15-17 (similar), cert. granted, 540 U.S. 1099 (2004).   
6 Cases like Yamashita, supra, cited by Respondents (at 12) have no 
relevance.  Those cases concern battlefield commissions, not commissions 
established years later and operating outside a theater of war.  Those cases 
also implicate specific-deterrence interests (“incapacitation”), which are 
not at issue here because the Government has the power to detain enemy 




And should Petitioner ultimately prevail, unlawful 
combatants would still be triable by courts-martial, Article 
III courts, and commissions set up by Congress.  (Congress 
has expressly provided that violations of the laws of war are 
triable in courts-martial.  See 10 U.S.C. §818.)   
This Court has preempted percolation among the courts 
of appeals by concentrating all Guantanamo habeas 
litigation in the D.C. Circuit.  Pet. 13.  Even within that single 
Circuit, all other commission cases are in abeyance pending 
Hamdan’s final resolution.  Reply App. 1-4.  Only a prompt 
resolution of the questions presented by this Court can 
deliver the requisite finality.  The questions presented are 
squarely raised in this case, making it an ideal vehicle for 
their resolution. 
5.  The Government also contends that the Court might 
avoid the questions presented if the commission proceedings 
are allowed to run their course.  It speculates that the Court 
of Appeals may reverse the District Court’s decision that 
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), does not 
require abstention.  This scenario seems unlikely, but, if 
anything, it militates in favor of granting the Petition.   
In the first place, even if Respondents’ scenario played 
out in full and the commission acquitted Petitioner, that 
would not end the matter:  The Appointing Authority and 
Review Board could send the case back to the commission; 
and even if Petitioner were ultimately acquitted by the 
Appointing Authority and the President, commission rules 
permit Respondents to try Hamdan again on other offenses 
(such as conspiring to commit some other offense, or even 
aiding and abetting the same object offenses for which he is 
currently charged).  32 C.F.R. §9.5(p).  As long as the 
Military Order stands, Respondents can subject Petitioner to 
new trials, ad infinitum. Cf. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18 
(1998) (“capable of repetition, yet evading review”).   
Second, Councilman emphasized that in creating the 
modern court-martial, Congress carefully balanced military 
needs against procedural fairness. Id. at 758-60.  It is 
precisely this system that Respondents now reject.  
Hamdan’s commission thus lacks the factual predicate for 
abstention, a system "established by Congress and carefully 
designed to protect not only military interests but [the 
defendant’s] legitimate interests as well." Id. at 760.7  Should 
                                                
7 Councilman’s formulation of “interests” tracks military law, where 




a lower court extend Councilman to commissions, it must 
first find that the tribunals are congressionally authorized 
and fundamentally fair.  A court decision to abstain, far from 
militating against certiorari, would magnify the need for it.  
This is particularly so because Petitioners’ presence rights 
have already been violated in the commission.  Pet. App. 27. 
Even under the Councilman framework, abstention is an 
equitable doctrine that requires balancing the legal interests 
at stake.  It is this Court and not a lower court that should 
perform that task, and sooner rather than later.  The trials of 
Petitioner and other commission defendants pose some of 
the most pressing and momentous issues of our times.  Pet. 8 
(quoting Milligan, supra).  These trials should not be allowed 
to proceed under a legal cloud; if their design is unlawful, 
this Court should make that clear so that trials by legally 
competent tribunals can begin.  Alternatively, if these 
commissions can go forward, they should do so with this 
Court’s imprimatur. Waiting to decide the legality of the 
commission process, with the possible result that convictions 
will need to be undone and defendants retried, serves no 
compelling interest and is contrary to the goals of efficiency 
and finality. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989).  
Indeed, if the Court of Appeals interpreted Councilman 
as Respondents suggest, that new rule would have dramatic 
reverberations.  To take just one example, it would give the 
Government the ability to evade for years habeas review of 
any and all detainee cases by designating the detainees 
eligible for commissions, a step that would eviscerate Rasul, 
supra.  See Golden, After Terror, A Secret Rewriting of Military 
Law, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2004, at 1 (stating that the Counsel 
to the Vice President at one point "urged" the White House 
Counsel to seek a blanket designation of all the detainees 
being sent to Guantanamo as eligible for trial under the 
president's [November 13, 2001 military] order" and that the 
White House Counsel "agreed").   
6. The Government also tries to analogize the Petition to 
a criminal interlocutory appeal. Yet “the interlocutory status 
of the case may be no impediment to certiorari where the 
opinion of the court below has decided an important issue, 
otherwise worthy of review, and Supreme Court 
                                                                                                 
nonetheless claim (at 16) that Hamdan lacks constitutional rights since he 
has "no voluntary ties to the United States." This position, aside from 
ignoring the "ties" the Government has created by seizing and detaining for 
years a person who claims to be an innocent civilian, has already been 




intervention may serve to hasten or finally resolve the 
litigation.” Robert L. Stern, et al., Supreme Court Practice 260 
(8th ed 2002); id., at 259-60 (citing eighteen cases of this Court, 
including the UCMJ case Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 
(1987), which overruled the service-connection test at issue 
in Councilman, supra). When Respondents desired similar 
“interlocutory” review in In re Cheney, where separation-of-
powers questions were threshold issues, Respondents stated 
it would serve no purpose to require the proceedings below 
to run their course before granting review. U.S. Pet. 23-24, In 
re Cheney, No. 03-475; U.S. Reply Br., No. 03-475, at 15.  Such 
a requirement would likewise serve no purpose here. 
7.  On the other side, the arguments for this Court to 
hear this matter now are compelling.  Because oral argument 
in this case has been scheduled for March 8, this Petition 
should be granted to avoid a crisis of legal uncertainty that 
will becloud the commissions for many months. Were this a 
case that might be expected to “go away” following the 
decision of the Court of Appeals, denying the Petition to 
obtain appellate guidance might be appropriate.  But given 
the gravity of the issues presented, a gravity Respondents 
themselves have emphasized, this is not that case.   
Mr. Hamdan has waited for over three years to have a 
fair trial. Throughout this time, he has languished in 
detention, deprived of his liberty and access to his wife and 
children.8  As amici have pointed out, the danger to him, and 
others like him, from continuing delay underscores the 
importance of the issues presented, as well as the need to 
                                                
8 The Government (at 8) mischaracterizes Hamdan’s federal-court 
petition.  The lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention as an “enemy 
combatant” will be academic if Petitioner may be imprisoned as a 
defendant before a military commission.  In his habeas petition, therefore, 
Petitioner seeks to resolve the lawfulness of his detention as an “enemy 
combatant” if his challenge to the commission succeeds.  See Habeas 
Petition, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 04-1519, D.D.C., Prayer for Relief, ¶7-10. 
Invalidation of the military commission process would also clear the 
way for Petitioner’s evaluation and release by the Annual Review Board 
procedure that the Government has established. See Special Defense 
Department Briefing on Status of Military Tribunals, Dec. 20, 2004, at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20041220-1841.html.  
Hamdan, and others like him, cannot receive the benefit of these 




move this case toward final resolution as soon as possible. 
8.  In arguing for reversal on the merits, Respondents 
contend that federal courts may not review the President’s 
interpretations of treaties, his determinations of the status of 
individuals as unlawful belligerents, and any procedures he 
may establish to try alleged violations of the laws of war.  
This argument is contrary to the letter and spirit of Hamdi 
and Rasul and, if accepted, would overturn two centuries of 
decisions of this Court, including decisions overruling 
Executive Branch interpretations of treaties and requiring 
Executive Branch compliance with those treaties as judicially 
construed.  Only this Court can decisively repudiate 
Respondents’ extravagant claim of Executive prerogative.  
This Court has long exercised its jurisdiction to evaluate the 
legality of constitutionally extraordinary actions taken by the 
President, Congress, and lower courts.  E.g., Rasul, supra; 
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Clinton v. 
Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997); Reid, supra; Youngstown, supra.  The 
Court should exercise such jurisdiction here. 
a. In interpreting the Third Geneva Convention 
(“GPW”), the District Court did not usurp Executive Branch 
authority but performed its Article III duty to declare and 
enforce “the supreme Law of the Land.”  See Pet. 19-20; The 
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884) (holding 
treaties judicially enforceable when they "prescribe a rule by 
which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be 
determined"); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635, 657 (1853); Kolovrat 
v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 
(1928); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924); United 
States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).   
The District Court’s ruling that the GPW extends to 
Petitioner and is judicially enforceable gives effect to the text 
of the pertinent treaty provisions and the treaty’s ratification 
history.  In so ruling, the District Court applied the GPW in a 
manner consistent with United States military practice since 
World War II, a practice that has been and remains essential 
to the protection of the men and women of the American 
Armed Services captured in conflicts abroad.  Pet. App. 15. 
The Government’s claim that the GPW is not “judicially 
enforceable” ignores its ratification history and the fact that 
the treaty has long been given effect – and codified -- by 




giving the GPW effect obviates the need to consider 
whether, in the absence of such law, the President’s Military 
Order violates the Suspension Clause.  See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 
at 2650 (plurality opinion) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 
301 (2001)); Ogbudimka v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 220-21 
(C.A.3 2003); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-347 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring). 
The Government claims (at 20) that the Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”) satisfy the GPW’s Article 
5 requirement that a detainee’s POW status be determined 
by a “competent tribunal.”  But the Government has stated 
that CRSTs are not Article 5 tribunals.  DoD Background 
Briefing on the Combatant Status Review Tribunal, 
http://defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr200407070981.ht
ml.  As the District Court noted, Respondents  have 
admitted that the CSRTs do not determine POW status but 
simply decide “whether the detainee is properly detained as 
an enemy combatant.”  Pet. App. 13 (citations omitted). 
b.  The Government’s argument that 10 U.S.C §836 does 
not require Petitioner to be tried under court-martial 
procedures also misses the mark.  The District Court's 
reading of section 836 is not only faithful to the text of the 
statute but also accords with historical practice:  Even before 
the enactment of the UCMJ, military commissions generally 
followed the same procedures as courts-martial.  See, e.g., W. 
Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 841 (2d ed. 1920).  
In providing that the rules for military commissions 
“may not be contrary to or inconsistent with” the UCMJ, 
§836 codified that longstanding tradition. The statute, as 
interpreted by the District Court, does not require that all 
rules for courts-martial and commissions be identical, and it 
does not in any way encroach on the President's war 
powers.9 Rather, the statute simply recognizes that the 
confrontation right and the right to be present at all stages of 
trial are fundamental.  It is for that reason that the UCMJ 
guarantees these rights in courts-martial and commissions. 
Such rights are universally recognized as inviolable under 
common law, military law, and international law. As the 
                                                
9 U.S. Const., Art I, §8 gives Congress the power to "define and 
punish . . .  Offences against the Law of Nations."  There is no doubt about 




Court long ago observed, “[a] leading principle that 
pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after 
indictment found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the 
prisoner,” for the right to be present is of “peculiar 
sacredness,” and necessitated by the “dictates of humanity.”  
Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372, 375 (1895) (emphasis 
added).  The integrity of American justice, and the honor of 
its judicial institutions, demand that these rights be 
respected. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1363 
(2004); Amicus Br. of Noah Feldman, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
No. 04-5393 (C.A.D.C.) (Iraqi tribunal provides as "minimum 
guarantees" that the accused will be "tried in his presence"). 
9. These issues will not be “narrowed” by intermediate 
appellate review, for whatever that court decides, the 
questions presented will remain. Respondents have done 
everything possible to evade this Court’s review of its 
commissions, from setting them up at Guantanamo to 
changing their rules mid-stream.  These maneuvers  and rule 
changes only highlight the commissions’ legal defects, all of 
which are rooted in Respondents’ insistence that all 
limitations on Executive Branch power disappear whenever 
the President utters the magic words “military 
commissions.”  Until this Court clarifies that such limitations  
do exist, a question specifically reserved by Quirin, 317 U.S. 
at 29, 47, corrosive questions about the lawfulness of the 
commissions will continue to fester.10  
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons as well as those set forth in 
the Petition, the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before 
Judgment should be granted. 
 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
                                                
10 In this case, review by the federal judiciary is already under way 
and cannot (and should not) be avoided. The challenge is to get it right on 
the merits.  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, 
J., dissenting); Chief Justice Burger, Annual Report on the State of the 
Judiciary, 62 A.B.A. J. 443, 444 (1976) (“any case decided in any district 
court with a genuine need for swift review by the Supreme Court can be 
the subject of a petition for certiorari before judgment” and “[n]o one can 
accurately point to a case in which the Supreme Court has failed to give 
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